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PUBLIC WILDLIFE ON PRIVATE LAND: 
UNIFYING THE SPLIT ESTATE TO ENHANCE 
TRUST RESOURCES 
REED WATSON† 
ABSTRACT 
In the United States, wildlife is a publicly owned resource, yet the 
majority of wildlife habitat is privately owned. This division of 
ownership has perpetuated conflicts over such topics as endangered 
species, public hunting access, and crop depredation. Tensions arise 
not only between private property rights and the public interest, which 
are both regrettably dynamic legal concepts, but more fundamentally 
over the division of economic rents generated from the combination of 
public wildlife and private habitat. 
This Article examines the nature of the split wildlife estate and the 
potential to unify it with public-private partnerships. A review of the 
public trust doctrine and its historical evolution reveals that state 
governments can and, in many instances, should share with private 
landowners the financial benefits of wildlife stewardship—not only the 
costs. Two case studies demonstrate how unifying the split wildlife 
estate can lead to improvements in wildlife habitat and an increase in 
the health and value of wildlife resources. 
INTRODUCTION 
On a crisp morning in August of 2002, Jay Newell shot the 
biggest elk of his life.1 Newell estimated that the mature bull weighed 
more than 1,000 pounds, a trophy by almost anyone’s standard, yet 
the harvest was not cause for celebration.2 As he walked towards the 
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 1.  Tom Dickson, The Elk Next Door: Why One Person’s Prized (or Profitable) Elk Has 
Become Another Person’s Elk Depredation Problem, MONT. OUTDOORS, Nov.–Dec., 2003, 
available at fwp.mt.gov/mtoutdoors/HTML/articles/2003/elkdepredation.htm. 
 2.  Id. 
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downed animal, there were no high-fives or pats on the back from 
hunting companions. This was no typical elk hunt. It was a culling 
operation intended to limit property damage.3 
Newell, a wildlife biologist for Montana Fish, Wildlife, and 
Parks, had spent the night attempting to haze elk out of irrigated 
agricultural fields twenty-five miles east of Billings, Montana.4 On the 
ranch where he shot the bull, a herd of elk had been gorging for 
weeks on rows of corn, beets, and alfalfa.5 When noise makers and 
professional herders failed to drive the animals back onto the forested 
public land to the south, the state agency decided that shooting some 
of the animals was the only remaining option.6 
Culling herds with sharpshooters is not how state wildlife 
agencies prefer to manage game populations, but such measures have 
become more common as wildlife exact an increasing financial toll on 
farmers and ranchers.7 In the years leading up to the above incident, 
Steve Sian, the ranch owner, had lost as much as fifteen percent of his 
annual crop to elk depredation, a non-trivial amount in an industry 
that fluctuates with the weather.8 Sian had given dozens of locals 
permission to hunt on the property, but they were unsuccessful at 
reducing the herd’s numbers or its impact.9 Elk adapt quickly to 
hunting pressure and often wait until after dark to enter agricultural 
fields.10 Additionally, neighboring ranches that allowed very little or 
no hunting became safe havens where the elk could retreat during the 
day. Like many landowners, Sian had previously enjoyed seeing elk 
and other wildlife on his property, but that enjoyment faded when 
 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7. Montana still uses game damage hunts as a means to reduce property damage caused 
by high wildlife concentrations, and Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks enlists private citizens 
from a Game Damage Hunt Roster to participate in the culling operations. See Game Damage 
Hunts and Management Seasons, MONT. FISH, WILDLIFE & PARKS, 
http://fwp.mt.gov/hunting/seasons/damage.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) (enabling private 
citizens to enlist in a Game Damage Hunt Roster for culling operations organized by Montana 
Fish, Wildlife and Parks to reduce property damage caused by wildlife). 
 8.  Dickson, supra note 1. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  For safety reasons, most states limit legal hunting hours to thirty minutes before 
sunrise until thirty minutes after sunset. These limits would not necessarily apply to culling 
operations carried out by state wildlife agencies. See, e.g., MONT. FISH, WILDLIFE & PARKS, 
DEER, ELK & ANTELOPE HUNTING REGULATIONS 15 (2013). 
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their presence began to threaten the ranch’s financial future.11 Much 
of the tension surrounding wildlife management and, in particular, 
the management of game species, stems from the fact that wildlife is 
publicly owned,12 while most wildlife habitat is privately owned.13 Per 
the North American model of wildlife conservation, wild animals are 
public property managed by each state for the benefit of its citizens.14 
These public resources are not stationary, however, nor do they 
confine themselves to publicly owned and funded lands. Wild animals 
such as elk and deer routinely cross onto privately owned property, 
where they consume valuable crops, destroy fences, and inflict costly 
property damage.15 The result is a kind of split estate—an overlap of 
valuable resources, the rights to which are held by separate and 
distinct entities. Much like the separation of surface and sub-surface 
mineral rights can generate conflicts and inefficiencies in the 
extraction of minerals and fossil fuels,16 the division of rights to 
wildlife and wildlife habitat has occasioned an increasing number of 
conflicts over public access, private property damage, and the 
appropriate division of the costs and benefits that wildlife generate. 
One approach to minimizing wildlife-landowner conflicts is to 
share the benefits and burdens of wildlife stewardship between the 
state and private landowners—in essence to unify the split estate so 
that private habitat owners have an incentive to act as stewards of the 
public’s wildlife resources. The question is whether unification is 
legal. The public trust doctrine is an ancient legal concept that 
arguably vested public property rights in certain natural resources 
and precluded the government from transferring those resources to 
private parties.17 If applied broadly to wildlife resources, it could be 
 
 11.  Dickson, supra note 1. 
 12.  See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The 
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 713–19 (2005) 
(listing twenty-five state statutes declaring wildlife to be state property). 
 13.  DONALD R. LEAL & J. BISHOP GREWELL, HUNTING FOR HABITAT: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO STATE-LANDOWNER PARTNERSHIPS 3 (1999). 
 14.  MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE LAW 10–15 (1997); ERIC G. BOLEN & WILLIAM L. ROBINSON, WILDLIFE ECOLOGY 
AND MANAGEMENT 3–5 (2003); THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW (1980). 
 15.  Of course, domestic livestock eat crops and destroy fences on private property too. 
The critical difference is that livestock are privately owned and generate financial benefits that 
the private landowner can legally capture in the marketplace. 
 16.  Timothy Fitzgerald, Evaluating Split Estates in Oil and Gas Leasing, 86 LAND 
ECON. 294, 294 (2010). 
 17.  Compare Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 490 (1970), with James L. Huffman, Speaking of 
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used to prohibit private landowners from acquiring an ownership 
interest in wildlife or influencing how wildlife is managed.18 
Consistent with the doctrine’s historical foundation, courts have 
struck down sovereign transfers of certain lands and natural resources 
when those transfers served no obvious public interest.19  For decades, 
however, legal scholars have argued for expanding the public trust 
doctrine beyond its historical scope to prohibit not only states from 
alienating or abrogating control over trust resources, but also to 
erode private contracts and property rights.20 Courts have adopted 
this expansive formulation of the doctrine to undo surface water 
transfers21 and to recognize public access rights over private land 
where none had previously existed.22 The application of the public 
trust doctrine to wildlife has the potential to alter the allocation of 
rights and responsibilities significantly between state wildlife agencies 
 
Inconvenient Truths–A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 
(2007) (presenting contrasting views of the public trust doctrine and its application). 
 18.  See, e.g., RICK APPLEGATE, PUBLIC TRUSTS: A NEW APPROACH TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 56–57 (1976) (concluding that wildlife should be placed in the 
public trust, with the national public as beneficiary for all wildlife); Patrick Redmond, The 
Public Trust in Wildlife: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 249, 249 
(2009) (describing the inconsistent and “bumpy” application of the doctrine to wildlife 
resources); Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust in 
Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 74 (2000) (arguing that the public trust doctrine 
generally precludes all dispositions of wildlife resources to private interests and abdications of 
wildlife management responsibilities). See generally Deborah G. Musiker et al., The Public Trust 
and Parens Patriae Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L. 
REV. 87 (1995); Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to 
Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723 (1989) (proposing that the scope of the public 
trust doctrine be expanded to encompass all wildlife and the habitat upon which it depends and 
arguing that the approach is jurisprudentially sound given the similarity between water and 
wildlife). 
 19.  See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892) (holding that the public 
trust doctrine would not sanction “the abdication of the general control of the state over lands 
under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake”). 
 20.  Sax, supra note 17, at 490; see also David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, 
Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 
711–13 (2008) (proposing a synthesis of the public trust doctrine and human rights in response 
to climate change and other modern environmental issues). 
 21.  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (holding that the state of 
California has an affirmative duty to consider the public trust in the planning and allocation of 
water resources and to protect public trust uses such as recreational and aesthetic values 
whenever feasible). 
 22.  Mont. Coalition of Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding 
that the public trust doctrine created a public right of access to privately owned stream beds 
underlying all waterways capable of recreational use in the state). 
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and private landowners23 and to exacerbate the controversies and rent 
dissipation caused by the split wildlife estate. 
This Article examines how the public trust doctrine influences 
the management of public wildlife on private land and whether, 
consistent with the doctrine, states can transfer ownership and 
management of wildlife to private landowners. Part I explains the 
split estate dilemma of managing public wildlife on private land. Part 
II outlines the history of the public trust doctrine as it applies to 
wildlife resources, finding little historical evidence to suggest state 
governments are as constrained by the doctrine as some 
commentators have suggested. Parts III and IV reflect on the success 
of public-private partnerships and explain how contracting with 
private landowners for wildlife stewardship services is consistent with 
states’ wildlife trusteeship and, in some instances, might be necessary 
to maximize public wildlife values in the face of the split wildlife 
estate. Part V concludes. 
I. THE SPLIT WILDLIFE ESTATE 
For many, the image of a deer or an elk meandering through a 
wilderness area epitomizes the North American conservation 
model—abundant wildlife inhabiting public land “where the earth 
and its community of life are untrammeled by man.”24 Though the 
United States has sizeable endowments of both wildlife and publicly 
owned lands,25 the distribution of these resources does not perfectly 
align. In the West, where the ratio of public to private land is highest, 
the asymmetry is somewhat seasonal. Large ungulates summer in 
higher elevation terrain, which is typically federally owned, until 
scarce food and cold temperatures force them out of the mountains 
 
 23.  See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 12, at 713–19 (2005) (describing the additional 
regulatory authority and legal rights conferred to states by the public trust doctrine over and 
above those available under states’ police powers); John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, 
“Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 331, 355 (2003) (“In keeping with the leading public trust decisions involving water 
resources or tidelands, [state ownership] language could be interpreted to mean that the 
doctrine of public ownership of wildlife supports imposing affirmative obligations on 
government officials to protect wildlife.”). 
 24.  See The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1964). 
 25.  See ROSS W. GORTE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND 
OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 1 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/R42346.pdf (noting the federal government owns and manages approximately 640 million 
acres of land, or roughly twenty-eight percent of the nation’s total land area). 
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and onto private land.26 In Eastern and Midwestern states, where the 
percentage of private land ownership is much higher, publicly owned 
wildlife is more likely to occupy private land year-round. 
Whether seasonal or year-round, the presence of public wildlife 
on private land creates a situation similar to a split estate of surface 
and mineral rights; specifically, the ownership of overlying resources 
is held by separate and distinct entities. The economic incentives and 
resulting legal principles surrounding split mineral and surface estates 
have been studied in significant detail27 and are worth considering in 
the context of public wildlife and private wildlife habitat. With a 
unified surface and sub-surface estate, the single owner bears the full 
costs and benefits of her actions and unilaterally determines where, 
when, how, and at what rate to extract the sub-surface resources. By 
contrast, when the surface and sub-surface rights are held by two 
different parties, conflicts routinely emerge over issues of access, 
waste disposal, allocation of liability, and, in general, the hierarchy of 
the divided property rights.28 As Chouinard and Steinhoff explain in 
the context of coal-bed methane extraction: 
Subsurface rights give energy companies surface access, but exactly 
what that means for overlying landowners remains highly uncertain 
and requires negotiation on a case-by-case basis between the 
parties. In general, negotiations to date have not quieted landowner 
resentment over the intrusion of energy companies on their land. 
From the perspective of energy companies, failed negotiations 
result in costly delays (even foregone development) in gas 
extraction and possible legal action.29 
In the context of public wildlife on private land, the split estate 
conflict usually centers on three issues: public access, private property 
damage, and the claimed privatization of public wildlife.30 The issue of 
public access concerns whether the presence of a publicly owned 
 
 26.  See, e.g., Laura Lundquist, Judge: Bison Can Winter in More of Park County, 
BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/wildlife/ 
article_b38e4c48-590f-11e2-8a01-001a4bcf887a.html. 
 27.  See, e.g., Andrew C. Mergen, The Problem of Federal/Private Split Estate Lands, 33 
LAND & WATER L. REV. 419 (1998); Andrew M. Miller, A Journey through Mineral Estate 
Dominance, the Accommodation Doctrine, and Beyond: Why Texas Is Ready to Take the Next 
Step with a Surface Damage Act, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 461 (2003); Drake D. Hill & P. Jaye Rippley, 
The Split Estate: Communication and Education versus Legislation, 4 WYO. L. REV. 585 (2004). 
 28.  See Hayley H. Chouinard & Christina Steinhoff, Split-Estate Negotiations: The Case of 
Coal-Bed Methane, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 233, 236–38 (2008) (explaining some of the conflicts that 
split mineral and surface estates can create). 
 29.  Id. at 234. 
 30.  The latter, which is the primary focus of this article, typically concerns a division of 
economic rents between the state as owner of the wildlife and private landowners or outfitters. 
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resource on private land creates a public access right or easement 
over that private land. Several courts have recognized such rights with 
respect to water flowing across private property. For instance, 
Montana has recognized a public access right to all streams capable of 
recreational use regardless of streambed ownership.31 Therefore, 
anglers in Montana are legally entitled to walk through private 
property so long as they remain below a stream’s mean high water 
mark. By contrast, Colorado law forbids boaters, anglers, and other 
recreationists from touching privately owned streambeds underlying 
non-navigable waters.32 No Western state has yet recognized a public 
access right across private land based solely on the presence of 
terrestrial wildlife,33 perhaps because the stream access disputes have 
been so contentious.34 Nonetheless, given the similarities between 
water and wildlife—both are publicly owned, fugitive resources 
managed by state governments for the benefit of the public—and the 
expanding conception of the public trust doctrine described below, a 
lawsuit seeking to apply the stream access rationale to terrestrial 
wildlife is likely. 
The property damage issue concerns whether private landowners 
should be compensated for financial injury caused by publicly owned 
wildlife. Whereas the access issue raises a question of public rights, 
the property damage issue raises a question of public responsibility—
namely, whether the state should bear the cost of wildlife forage and 
property damage on private lands. The answer to this question has 
significant financial implications. Jim Knight estimates the annual 
cost of wildlife forage on private property in Montana alone is $31.5 
 
 31. Mont. Coalition of Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 23-2-302(1) (2012); see also Bitterroot River Protective Assn. v. Bitterroot 
Conservation Dist., 198 P.3d 219, 242 (Mont. 2008) (holding the public has a right to access 
privately owned and operated irrigation ditches containing fugitive waters capable of 
appropriation). 
 32.  See, e.g., People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (“It is the general rule of 
property law recognized in Colorado that the land underlying non-navigable streams is the 
subject of private ownership and is vested in the proprietors of the adjoining lands.”). Despite 
this precedent, recent legislative efforts in Colorado have attempted to exempt stream 
recreationists from the state’s civil trespass laws. H.B. 10-1188, 67th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 
2010). 
 33. Curran, 682 P.2d at 171, had the practical effect of allowing the public to wade and fish 
on privately owned property, but the decision was based on the presence of state owned water. 
 34.  Deborah B. Schmidt, Public Trust Doctrine in Montana: Conflict at the Headwaters, 19 
ENVTL. L. 675, 678 (1988) (discussing how “[following Curran,] direct conflict between 
landowner and recreationist rights in water is likely to occur unless water users, administrators, 
and public policy makers work to develop a consensus on reasonable and equitable ways to 
share the resource and deal with its shortages”). 
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million.35 Private landowners bear these costs, plus the costs of 
repairing countless miles of wildlife-damaged fences, usually without 
any compensation from the state as legal owner of the wildlife. 
Though some Western states have big game compensation 
programs,36 most do not, and private landowners have a very low 
probability of recovering damages in court.37 
The opposite of the cost allocation issue is the question of 
revenue allocation: namely, whether and under what circumstances 
states should share the economic rents generated by publicly owned 
wildlife with private landowners.38 Some commentators have argued 
that states must use financial incentives to motivate landowners to 
engage in wildlife habitat improvements.39 Several others have 
concluded that rent sharing amounts to the privatization of public 
wildlife, which contradicts the North American conservation model 
 
 35.  JIM KNIGHT & CAROLYN NISTLER, MONT. ST. UNIV. EXTENSION, THE 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF LANDOWNERS TO BIG GAME IN MONTANA 2 (2007), available at 
http://msuextension.org/publications/OutdoorsEnvironmentandWildlife/MT200604AG.pdf. 
 36.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1108 (2012) (outlining an elaborate compensation 
program for wildlife forage on private land). The Canadian provinces have similar programs. 
See Kimberly K. Wagner et al., Compensation Programs for Wildlife Damage in North America, 
25 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. 315, 324 (1997) (finding that seven provinces have compensation 
programs). 
 37.  See Montana v. Rathbone, 100 P.2d 86, 95 (Mont. 1940) (“We again call attention to 
the fact that wild animals are the property of the State, and the State cannot be sued without its 
consent; whereas the owner of property, damaged by trespassing cattle or other livestock, may 
sue for damages, and, if the trespasses are repeated, he may also apply for injunctive relief 
against the owner of the livestock.”). 
 38.  It is necessary to distinguish between revenues derived from the permission to hunt a 
particular parcel of private land, which permission is given or withheld by the private 
landowner, and revenues derived from hunting permits, which are issued by state wildlife 
agencies. Private landowners throughout the West lease hunting access, primarily to big game, 
waterfowl, and upland bird hunters, but these leases concern only access to the property. 
Without the required licenses and permits, access is of little value to a hunter. States that convey 
transferable hunting permits to private landowners are granting those landowners influence 
over the allocation of hunting opportunities, such as the right to take game animals, and it is this 
delegation of management authority that fuels the claims of wildlife privatization. See generally 
Pallab Mozumder et al., Lease and Fee Hunting on Private Lands in the U.S.: A Review of the 
Economic and Legal Issues, 12 HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF WILDLIFE 1 (2007) (describing the 
various types of wildlife related income earned by private landowners). 
 39.  See Patrick F. Noonan & Michael D. Zagata, Wildlife in the Market Place: Using the 
Profit Motive to Maintain Wildlife Habitat, 10 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. 46 (1982) (explaining 
that, unless the wildlife professional captalizes on the American “profit-motive,” the passive 
expectation of private landowners to produce wildlife habitat is not likely to ensure long-term 
wildlife health); LEAL & GREWELL, supra note 13, at 2, 4 (1999) (describing how the market, 
rather than strained state agencies, provides an incentive for landowners to improve wildlife 
habitat and how these habitat improvements benefit game and non-game species). 
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and jeopardizes wildlife health.40 Of the issues arising from the split 
wildlife estate, revenue allocation is particularly divisive because it 
pits legal and equity-based claims for limiting wildlife 
commercialization against utilitarian arguments for it. 
Strategies for resolving the access, property damage, and revenue 
sharing issues that arise from the split wildlife estate are shaped by 
the incentives of private landowners and the ability of states, as 
trustees of public wildlife, to harness those incentives in the public’s 
interest. Specifically, whether private landowners manage their 
property for the benefit or detriment of the public’s wildlife depends 
on private landowners’ view of wildlife as either an asset or a 
liability.41 This largely depends on whether the wildlife imposes a net 
cost or generates a net revenue for the landowner. And the ability of 
private landowners to generate revenues from public wildlife 
ultimately depends on the application of the public trust doctrine to 
wildlife. If the doctrine is read to prohibit delegations of management 
authority and the division of wildlife revenues entirely, then wildlife 
could only indirectly generate revenues for private landowners via 
hunting leases and other access-oriented contracts. Because of this, 
the problems of split ownership are likely to persist. Conversely, if 
courts interpret the public trust doctrine as allowing wildlife transfers 
that advance the public interest, state wildlife agencies and private 
landowners will enjoy greater latitude to write contracts that resolve 
the problems of split ownership. 
In short, the primary mechanism by which states can motivate 
private landowners to enhance wildlife habitat or increase public 
access is by unifying the split estate and then transferring the wildlife 
ownership interest to those landowners. Whether such a transfer 
would survive judicial scrutiny depends on two factors: the court’s 
willingness to apply the public trust doctrine to wildlife42 and the 
court’s interpretation of the public trust doctrine’s history. 
 
 40.  See Paul Robbins & April Luginbuhl, The Last Enclosure: Resisting Privatization of 
Wildlife in the Western United States, 16 CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 45 (2006) (extolling 
the grass roots, bureaucratic, and political opposition to public-private sharing of wildlife 
revenues); Valerius Geist, How Markets in Wildlife Meat and Parts, and the Sale of Hunting 
Privileges, Jeopardize Wildlife Conservation, 2 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 15, 23 (1988) 
(describing paid hunting as a deterrent that excludes low income hunters, reduces hunting 
participation rates, and threatens the health of wildlife populations). 
 41.  See Noonan & Zagata, supra note 39, at 46 (1982) (describing how “many landowners 
are willing, in fact eager, to maintain wildlife habitat if it results in economic gain”). 
 42.  See Redmond, supra note 18, at 304 (“[T]he path to judicial recognition of the public 
trust in wildlife has not been smooth. Indeed, this path has been so crisscrossed and rutted with 
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II. WILDLIFE IN THE PUBLIC TRUST 
The principles of legal trusts arise in wildlife management via the 
public trust doctrine. Specifically, states hold wildlife in trust for the 
benefit of their citizens.43 This legal construct did not arise via a trust 
document or grant by the federal government, but first as a practical 
necessity under Roman law and later as a default rule under English 
common law. Like all common law principles, the public trust 
doctrine is not a static legal concept; it has evolved and will continue 
to evolve as courts apply the doctrine to new facts and circumstances. 
But because precedent binds these courts, the history of the public 
trust doctrine provides some limitation to the doctrine’s application. 
Therefore, it is important to understand this history to contextualize 
the current controversies over wildlife management on private land. 
Before examining the history in detail, the following primer on trust 
law describes the basic operation of public trusts with particular 
attention to the rights and responsibilities they create. 
A. Trust Law Fundamentals 
Though the public trust doctrine has been expanded to natural 
resources not contemplated by its Roman and common law origins, 
the operation of the trust vehicle—particularly the rights and 
responsibilities arising under the trust relationship—remains 
unchanged. Legal trusts can take many forms and serve a number of 
purposes, but the basic structure of all legal trusts is the same. A trust 
is a relationship whereby one person or entity manages property for 
the benefit of another.44 Typically, a “grantor” or “donor” entrusts 
 
competing doctrines of constitutional limitations, property rights, and statutory and agency 
mandates that drawing generalizations across state lines invites oversimplification.”). For 
example, after the Idaho Supreme Court declared the doctrine applicable to wildlife in 
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983), the Idaho 
legislature enacted a provision which expressly declared that Idaho’s public trust doctrine was 
“solely a limitation on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the title to the beds of 
navigable waters.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 43.  BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 14 at 10–15; Redmond, supra note 18; Darren K. 
Cottriel, The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First Century: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save an 
American Tradition?, 27 PAC. L.J. 1235, 1266–69 (1996); Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. 
Control Bd., 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that title to wild fish is 
vested in the state and held by it as trustee for the common ownership and use of the people); In 
re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (holding that, under the public trust 
doctrine, the Commonwealth of Virginia and the United States have the right and the duty to 
protect and preserve the public’s interest in natural wildlife resources). But see IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 58-1203 (2002). 
 44.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2007). 
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property to the “trustee” who must manage the trust property for the 
benefit of a specified “beneficiary” or charitable purpose. The trustee 
holds legal title to the trust property and owes a fiduciary duty to the 
beneficiary.45 The beneficiary, in turn, holds equitable title to the 
property but cannot consume the trust property in any manner 
inconsistent with the trust provisions.46 
Trusts can be either public or private.47 The critical distinction is 
whether the beneficiary is an identified individual or group of 
individuals or a charitable purpose that benefits society as a whole. 
For instance, public trusts may be created with the charitable purpose 
of alleviating hunger or increasing adult literacy. On the other hand, 
private trusts are created for the benefit of identifiable persons, often 
the grantor’s descendants. Regardless of whether a trust is public or 
private, the trustee holds a fiduciary obligation to manage the trust 
property exclusively for the benefit of the beneficiary.48 
A trustee’s fiduciary obligation subjects the trustee to a strict 
legal standard—a higher standard of care than ordinary care. Not 
only must a trustee use ordinary, reasonable skill and prudence in the 
management of trust property, a trustee must also ensure the trust 
property is profitable and secure against unreasonable loss.49 This 
fiduciary obligation does not require that the trustee personally 
perform all of the tasks required to maintain the trust property, but it 
does require that the trustee make the necessary arrangements if 
third-party assistance is needed.50 For instance, if the trust property is 
real estate, the trustee is not personally obligated to sweep the floors 
or clean the windows. However, the trustee is obligated to ensure the 
property does not fall into a state of disrepair and, consequently, may 
be required to hire professional janitorial services. Similarly, a trustee 
of financial funds may be required to hire a professional financial 
planner or investment strategist if the management of the trust 
property requires a competency beyond that which the trustee 
possesses. 
Though the trustee owes a strict fiduciary duty to the trust 
beneficiary, the trustee enjoys significant discretion in the way she 
 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See generally Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991). 
 50.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80 (2007). 
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administers the trust. So long as the trustee manages the trust 
property in accordance with the terms of the trust and with an 
undivided loyalty to the trust beneficiary, courts are usually hesitant 
to find a trustee in violation of her fiduciary duty.51 
Opposite the trustee is the trust beneficiary. Though the 
beneficiary holds equitable title to the trust property—the actual 
enjoyment and use of the property—the beneficiary does not possess 
a right to consume the trust property in any manner inconsistent with 
the terms of the trust.52 As such, the trustee’s fiduciary duty to 
preserve the trust property from unreasonable loss includes the 
obligation to ensure the beneficiary does not consume the trust 
property in a manner that frustrates the trust’s purpose. With this 
basic understanding of the rights and responsibilities created by legal 
trusts, we turn to the history of trust principles as applied to wildlife. 
B. Roman Law 
The public trust doctrine is a historical concept that most 
scholars trace back to sixth century Roman law. Not surprisingly, 
given its age, the historical roots of the public trust doctrine are 
themselves topics of much scholarly and judicial debate.53 However, 
most scholars agree that the story begins with the Justinian Code, 
completed in 529 A.D.54 
As to wildlife, Justinian summarized the law of the day as 
follows: 
Wild beasts, birds, fish and all animals, which live either in the sea, 
the air, or the earth, so soon as they are taken by anyone, 
immediately become by the law of nations the property of the 
captor; for natural reason gives to the first occupant that which had 
no previous owner. And it is immaterial whether a man takes wild 
beasts or birds upon his own ground, or on that of another. Of 
course anyone who enters the ground of another for the sake of 
 
 51.  See Cooter and Freedman, supra note 49, at 1054. 
 52.  ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 54–55 (2009). 
 53. See generally Huffman, supra note 17 (documenting the doctrine’s historical 
foundations and controversial application in current jurisprudence). 
 54.  Matthew E. Pecoy, Sitting on the Dock of the Bay: South Carolina’s Need for a General 
Submerged Land Lease Program, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 281, 282 (2006) (quoting 
JUSTINIAN, THE JUSTINIAN INST. 35 § 2.1.1 (J. B. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913)) (“By the law of 
nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea, and consequently 
the shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he 
respects habitations, monuments, and buildings which are not, like the sea, subject only to the 
law of nations.”). 
Watson (Do Not Delete) 5/19/2013  10:43 PM 
Spring 2013] PUBLIC WILDLIFE ON PRIVATE LAND 303 
hunting or fowling, may be prohibited by the proprietor, if he 
perceives his intention of entering.55 
Citing “special rules for bees, pigeons, peacocks, geese and other 
fowl that might leave their owners’ land but would return of their own 
accord,” Huffman notes that “wild creatures were owned by no one, 
not because they were thought to be owned by everyone, but because 
establishing private ownership required establishing special rules 
adapted to their wild nature.”56 According to Huffman, “[i]f there was 
a right held in common [under Roman law] it was the right to acquire 
private ownership of wild animals by capturing them.”57 
The inability of Roman law to define ownership of wildlife by 
any other rule than capture thus necessitated that ownership be 
shared in common until such capture was made. However, communal 
ownership of wildlife resources is by no means synonymous with 
sovereign trusteeship for exclusive public benefit. According to 
Patrick Deveney: 
Roman law was innocent of the idea of trusts, had no idea at all of a 
“public” (in the sense we use the term) as the beneficiary of such a 
trust, allowed no legal remedies whatever against state allotment of 
land, exploited by private monopolies everything (including the sea 
and the seashore) that was worth exploiting, and had a general idea 
of public rights that is quite alien to our own.58 
As such, there appears to be no support in Roman law for the 
claim that the public trust doctrine precluded the sovereign’s ability 
to transfer ownership of wildlife resources to private individuals or to 
share with private individuals the benefits of cooperatively managed 
wildlife populations. 
Under Roman law, there was no trust relationship between the 
government and the citizenry with regard to wildlife or any other 
natural resources; instead, public rights of access appeared to exist 
“unless and until a private person or the state required exclusive 
control of the resource.”59 Moreover, the ability of private landowners 
to exclude the public from hunting and fishing on private land 
suggests that private property rights outweighed any public right to 
hunt or fish. That wildlife populations were communally owned under 
 
 55.  Huffman, supra note 17, at 80 (quoting JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN § 
2.1.12 (Thomas Cooper trans. & ed., 1841)). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 
SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 17 (1976) (internal citation omitted). 
 59.  See id. at 21 (emphasis in original). 
Watson (Do Not Delete) 5/19/2013  10:43 PM 
304 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIII:291 
Roman law reflects only the difficulty of defining private rights in 
fugitive wildlife resources, not a trust-based restraint on the 
sovereign’s ability to alienate or grant exclusive use rights to natural 
resources. 
C. English Common Law 
Because the practical difficulties of defining individual rights in 
fugitive wildlife resources had not been solved, the common law of 
England similarly treated wildlife as common property subject to the 
rule of capture. Lord Bracton wrote that “[t]hings are said to be res 
nullius [owned by no one] in several different ways: by nature or the 
jus naturale, as wild beasts, birds and fish.”60 According to Blackstone, 
however, the common law did eventually evolve to allow a qualified 
private property right in wildlife.61 Such a right could be established 
according to one of three distinct principles: by capture and 
confinement so that wildlife “could not escape and use their natural 
liberty” (per industrium); by providing habitat to the offspring of 
wildlife species confined to nests or burrows (propter impotentium); 
or by “the privilege of hunting, taking, and killing them, in exclusion 
of other persons” on private land or on public land granted by the 
crown for the purpose of taking game (propter privilegium).62 Absent 
these circumstances, title to all wildlife was held by the crown as the 
practical shorthand for public ownership and pursuant to the “wise 
and orderly maxim, of assigning to everything capable of ownership a 
legal and determinant owner.”63 
According to Blackstone, another practical justification for 
vesting ownership of wildlife in the crown was to limit the conflict 
that would arise under the rule of capture applied to game animals. 
Title to those “species of wild animals, which the arbitrary 
constitutions of positive law have distinguished from the rest by the 
well-known appellation of game,” was held by the crown so as to limit 
the “disturbances and quarrels [that] would frequently arise among 
individuals, contending about the acquisition of this species of 
 
 60.  ANDREW ZURCHER, SPENSER’S LEGAL LANGUAGE: LAW AND POETRY IN EARLY 
MODERN ENGLAND 145 n.56 (2007) (quoting BRACTON, 2 DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS 
ANGLIAE 41 (1256)). 
 61.  Huffman, supra note 17, at 82. 
 62. Id. at 81 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 391 (1765)). 
 63.  Id. at 82. 
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property by first occupancy.”64 The concern appears to be that 
hunters and anglers would quarrel and potentially exhaust game 
populations in a race to establish ownership of wildlife via the rule of 
capture. 
Thus in Europe, despite claims that the natural law prohibited 
governments from limiting public access to game, “[t]he sovereigns 
have reserved to themselves, and to those to whom they judge proper 
to transmit it, the right to hunt all game, and have forbidden hunting 
to other persons.”65 By this account, sovereign ownership of game 
species did more to restrict public hunting access than enhance it. 
Not until the Magna Carta is there evidence of limitations on the 
sovereign’s ability to alienate commonly owned natural resources.66 
Chapter Sixteen of the Magna Carta reads: “No riverbanks shall be 
placed in defense henceforth except such as were so placed in the 
time of King Henry, our grandfather, by the same places and the 
same bounds as they were wont to be in his time.”67 This chapter was 
eventually understood to be a prohibition on the crown’s granting of 
exclusive fisheries.68 According to Blackstone, “making such grants, 
and by that means appropriating what seems to be unnatural to 
restrain, the use of running water, was prohibited for the future by 
King John’s great charter, and the rivers that were fenced in his time 
were directed to be laid open.”69 
It should be noted, however, that previous grants of exclusive 
hunting and fishing rights were not undone by the Magna Carta and 
the King’s authority to make such grants apparently persisted for 
several centuries after its signing.70 Indeed, there is evidence to 
suggest that the crown could alienate tidal lands and, by association, 
grant exclusive hunting and fishing privileges to private individuals 
long after the Magna Carta.71 Deveney explains that “there is no 
suggestion whatsoever of a public trust in Lord Hale’s writings, and 
he recognizes no limitations on the power of the Crown to convey 
 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 524 (1896) (quoting POTHIER, TRAITE DU DROIT 
DE PROPRIETE, NOS. 27-28 (1772)). 
 66.  Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes the 
People’s Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 197–200 (1980). 
 67.  MAGNA CARTA, CHAPT. 16, ART. 20 (Eng. 1225). 
 68.  Huffman, supra note 17, at 20. 
 69.  Id. at 23 n.121. 
  70.  Id. at 20. 
 71.  Id. at 20–23. 
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title to the coastal area.”72 Similarly, Hale acknowledged that title to 
submerged and tidal land could be and most often was privately 
owned and that it could be acquired by usage, custom, prescription, or 
conveyance from the Crown.73 Hale also explained “there is no public 
right to fish in navigable waters, though the public may be granted the 
liberty to do so.”74 
Though the Magna Carta is often cited as the first explicit 
restraint on the sovereign’s ability to alienate certain natural 
resources, it did not create a sovereign trusteeship in wildlife 
resources and had little effect on restraining resource alienation by 
the sovereign. According to historical accounts, the crown often 
transferred to private individuals the title to commonly owned lands 
as well as the exclusive hunting and fishing rights on those lands.75 Not 
until centuries later, in a sequence of American cases, was the public 
trust doctrine interpreted as providing any meaningful restraint on 
sovereign alienation of wildlife resources. 
D. American Jurisprudence 
Following the American Revolution, state governments 
succeeded the English Crown as sovereign trustees of public lands 
and other communally owned resources. The rights and 
responsibilities of the state governments vis-à-vis their citizenry were 
unknown and frequently disputed, as suggested by the extensive body 
of case law discussed below. Emerging from this case law is a theme 
relevant to wildlife management today: although the public trust 
doctrine limits the alienability of trust resources, it does not preclude 
alienation that benefits the public interest.76 
First in the lineage of early American cases is Arnold v. Mundy,77 
a case concerning the ownership of tidal lands and oyster beds along 
 
 72.  Deveney, supra note 58, at 48. 
 73.  MATTHEW HALE, A TREATISE DE JURE MARIS ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM (1735), 
reprinted in STUART A. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING 
THERETO 370 (1888). 
 74.  Id. at 377. 
 75.  Deveney, supra note 58, at 33. 
 76.  Many of the cases that mark this evolution involve disputes of ownership to tidal lands, 
not wildlife. Because most conceptions of the public trust doctrine group these together as trust 
resources, these tidal land cases are relevant to this wildlife management inquiry. As explained 
below, some state courts and legislatures have expressly narrowed the application of the public 
trust doctrine to submerged lands, while others have explicitly included wildlife as a trust 
resource. See Redmond, supra note 18, at 259–304. 
 77.  6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). 
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New Jersey’s Rariton River. Though the riparian landowner had 
planted and maintained the oyster beds in question, and could trace 
title to the tidal land to the King of England, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court ruled the tidal lands and the overlying oyster beds were 
“common to all citizens, and that each has a right to use them 
according to his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate 
that use.”78 To reach this conclusion, the court nullified the original 
land transfer from the King of England as an invalid transfer of 
common property.79 In support of this conclusion, the court cited the 
Magna Carta, as well as English common law according to the 
expansive interpretations of Blackstone, Hale, and Bracton.80 Relying 
on these commentators, the Arnold court concluded that the citizens 
of New Jersey held “the legal estate and the usufruct [and] may make 
such disposition of them, and such regulation concerning them as they 
may think fit  . . . [through] the legislative body, who are the 
representatives of the people for this purpose.”81 
The court held that the New Jersey legislature may develop the 
commonly owned natural resources “at the public expense, or they 
may authorize others to do it by their own labour, and at their own 
expense, giving them reasonable tolls, rents, profits, or exclusive 
enjoyments.”82 However, the court described the state legislature’s 
powers as: 
. . . nothing more than what is called the jus regium, the right of 
regulating, improving, and securing for the common benefit of 
every individual citizen. The sovereign power itself, therefore, 
cannot, consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the 
constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute 
grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their 
common right. It would be a grievance which never could be long 
borne by a free people.83 
This passage is susceptible to at least two interpretations: as 
prohibiting the transfer of any stated-owned water, or as prohibiting 
 
 78.  Id. at 76–77. 
 79.  The court delineates three types of property: private, public, and common. According 
to the court, public property is transferable property owned by the government, whereas 
common property is inalienable public property “to be held, protected, and regulated for the 
common use and benefit.” Id. at 71. 
 80.  Huffman, supra note 17, at 18. Judge Kirkpatrick, writing for the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, simply misunderstood the common law of England and the practical impotence of the 
Magna Carta with respect to wildlife alienation by the sovereign. 
 81.  Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 13 . 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 78. 
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the transfer of all “the waters of the state.” The latter is more 
reasonable for two reasons. First, by New Jersey law, individuals 
owning lands adjacent to tidal waters “wherein oysters do or will 
grow” could plant and have the exclusive right of harvesting oysters.84 
Second, the New Jersey Supreme Court later reversed Arnold and in 
so doing confirmed the legislature’s authority to limit public access 
via alienation to private parties.85 
Despite being overturned, Arnold stands as the first articulation 
of the public trust doctrine as a significant, though not absolute, 
restraint on the ability of state governments to alienate state waters 
and the wildlife in those waters. 
The United States Supreme Court repeated this expanded notion 
of the public trust doctrine and laid the foundation for state 
ownership of wildlife in the 1842 case Martin v. Waddell,86 a tidal land 
case very similar to Arnold. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Taney explained, “[w]hen the people of New Jersey took possession 
of the reins of government, and took into their own hands the powers 
of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which before belonged 
to either the crown or the parliament, became immediately and 
rightly vested in the state.”87 Thus, according to the Supreme Court, 
the citizens of New Jersey held in common the navigable waters, 
submerged lands, and the wildlife lying thereon. 
The Court described how, under common law, the English crown 
could transfer trust lands but that such transfers were strictly 
construed so as to limit the alienation of commonly owned 
resources.88 The Supreme Court then suggested that the powers of 
 
 84.  Act of June 9, 1820, 1820 N.J. Laws 162 (providing for the preservation of clams and 
oysters). 
 85.  Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 459 (N.J. 1850) (“If, by this proposition, it is meant only 
to assert that a grant of all the waters of the state, to the utter destruction of the rights of 
navigation and fishery, would be an insufferable grievance, it is undoubtedly true . . . . But if it 
be intended to deny the power of the legislature, by grant, to limit common rights or to 
appropriate lands covered by water to individual enjoyment, to the exclusion of the public 
common rights of navigation or fishery, the position is too broadly stated.”). 
 86.  41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
 87.  Id. at 416. 
 88.  Id. at 411. (“The dominion and property in navigable waters and the lands under them 
being held by the King as a public trust, the grant to an individual of an exclusive fishery in any 
portion of it is so much taken from the common fund entrusted to his care for the common 
benefit. In such cases, whatever does not pass by the grant remains in the Crown for the benefit 
and advantage of the whole community. Grants of that description are therefore, construed 
strictly, and it will not be presumed that the King intended to part from any portion of the 
public domain unless clear and special words are used to denote it.”). 
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alienation held by state governments could exceed those held by the 
English crown at common law, presumably because the state 
legislature is a better representative of the public than was the 
English monarch.89 
Decades later, in the famous case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. 
v. Illinois,90 the Court defined those “different principles” and the 
category of sovereign transfers that are consistent with the public 
trust doctrine. Illinois Central raised the issue of the validity of a 
legislative grant of a significant portion of the Chicago harbor 
waterfront to a privately owned railroad.91 In answering that question, 
the Court referenced the public trust doctrine and explained that title 
to the submerged lands is “a title held in trust for the people of the 
state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on 
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from 
the obstruction or interference by private parties.”92  
The Supreme Court explained that, while the public trust 
doctrine prohibited Illinois from transferring control “over lands 
under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or 
lake,” and thus the legislative grant in question, it did not preclude 
transfers of trust property to private parties that aided in the public 
interest.93 According to the Court, 
[t]he interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in 
commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the 
erection of wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which purpose the 
state may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long as 
their disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can 
be made to the grants. It is grants of parcels of lands under 
navigable waters that may afford foundation for wharves, piers, 
docks, and other structures in aid of commerce, and grants of 
parcels which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public 
interest in the lands and waters remaining, that are chiefly 
considered and sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise 
 
 89.  Id. at 410–11 (“For when the revolution took place, the people of each state became 
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, 
and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered 
by the constitution to the general government. A grant made by their authority must, therefore, 
manifestly be tried and determined by different principles from those which apply to grants of 
the British crown, when the title is held by a single individual, in trust for the whole nation.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 90.  146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 91.  Id. at 452. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 452–53. 
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of legislative power consistently with the trust to the public upon 
which such lands are held by the state.94 
The Supreme Court thus recognized the distinction between a 
state’s wholesale abdication of its trust obligation and some lesser 
alienation of trust property that aids in the purpose of the public 
trust. According to the Court, “[t]he control of the state for the 
purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as 
are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be 
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest 
in the lands and waters remaining.”95 
Four years later, the United States Supreme Court would repeat 
this distinction in a case specifically dealing with state wildlife 
regulation under the public trust doctrine.96 Tracing the history of 
sovereign control of game species through Roman and common law, 
Justice White explained: 
While the fundamental principles upon which the common 
property in game rests have undergone no change, the development 
of free institutions has led to the recognition of the fact that the 
power or control lodged in the State, resulting from the common 
ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, 
as a trust for the benefit of all people, and not as a prerogative for 
the advantage of government, as distinct from the people, or for the 
benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good.97 
This passage is important for two reasons: first, it confirms the 
states’ trust obligations regarding wildlife management; second, it 
articulates the flexibility of the trust relationship terms. According to 
the Court’s explanation, this trust relationship precludes state wildlife 
management policies that benefit the government or private 
individuals instead of the public, but it does not preclude the 
management of trust resources for the benefit of private individuals 
and the public. This distinction is important because it allows for 
wildlife management policies that share the rents of publicly owned 
wildlife with the private landowners and for states to transfer a full or 
partial ownership stake in wildlife to private landowners who steward 
the wildlife for the public benefit. 
Several legal commentators have depicted the public trust 
doctrine as absolutely precluding state governments from transferring 
trust resources, including wildlife, or sharing with private landowners 
 
 94.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 95.  Id. at 453. 
 96.  Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
 97.  Id. at 529 (emphasis added). 
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the rents derived from shared habitat production.98 As explained 
above, this characterization has no historical basis. As far back as 
ancient Rome, private landowners could prevent members of the 
public from hunting or fishing communally owned wildlife on private 
land. Under English common law, private landowners could establish 
ownership of wildlife by providing habitat to certain wildlife species 
and, in some instances, by sovereign grant. And in the foundational 
American cases, the public trust doctrine only limited sovereign 
transfers of trust resources that were inconsistent with the public’s 
benefit. Expanding the public trust doctrine beyond these historical 
foundations to preclude all transfers of trust property would likely 
perpetuate the split ownership conflicts that currently characterize 
wildlife management. 
III. RANCHING FOR WILDLIFE 
The history of the public trust doctrine supports the assertion 
that states can transfer an ownership interest in wildlife resources to 
private landowners. Even grants of exclusive access and control are 
permissible if they advance the public interest.99 To be sure, states can 
expressly curtail the resources and uses protected by the public trust 
doctrine,100 supplant the doctrine with comprehensive environmental 
regulatory schemes,101 expand public access rights,102 or restrict the 
alienability of trust resources more narrowly than is proscribed by the 
 
 98.  See Sax supra note 17, at 490 (“When a state holds a resource which is available for the 
free use of the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism 
upon any government conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more 
restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties.”). 
 99.  See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 411 (1842) (“The dominion and property in 
navigable waters and the lands under them being held by the King as a public trust, the grant to 
an individual of an exclusive fishery in any portion of it is so much taken from the common fund 
entrusted to his care for the common benefit.”) (emphasis added). 
 100.  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (expressly limiting the doctrine to submerged 
lands under navigable waters); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1987) (applying the 
doctrine to tidelands and shorelands and distinguishing between the alienable jus privatum, or 
private property interest, and the inalienable jus publicum, or public authority interest in the 
context of allowing a statute that permits private property owners to install private recreational 
docks on abutting state property without paying a fee). But see Weden v. San Juan County, 958 
P.2d 273, 284 (Wash. 1998) (rejecting the notion that the doctrine would “sanction an activity 
that actually harms and damages the waters and wildlife of this state”). 
 101.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61–62 (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324. 
1701–06 (1999). 
 102.  See Mont. Coalition of Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (using 
the public trust doctrine to create a public right of access over privately owned stream beds 
underlying all water ways in the state capable of recreational use). 
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bedrock common law principles.103 Nonetheless, the argument that the 
public trust doctrine, by vesting wildlife ownership in the states, 
precludes states from alienating wildlife resources or delegating 
wildlife management authority is unfounded. Free from these 
assumed limitations, states have significant flexibility to contract with 
private landowners to overcome the issues of public access, property 
damage, and rent allocation that arise from the split wildlife estate. 
One model for unifying the split wildlife estate that has gained 
traction in recent years is called “ranching for wildlife.”104 Though the 
name elicits images of high-fenced game ranching, ranching for 
wildlife (RFW) actually describes state managed programs that use 
cooperative agreements between landowners and wildlife agencies to 
improve the quality of free-roaming wildlife populations.105 States 
with RFW programs106 encourage eligible landowners to invest time, 
money, and resources in wildlife habitat improvements and expanded 
hunting opportunities on their properties.107 In return for these 
investments, states modify their hunting regulations to allow enrolled 
landowners greater flexibility to manage and profit from the public’s 
wildlife.108 
The details of each state’s program are unique and vary 
according to the objectives of the wildlife department, private 
landowners, and the state’s legislature.109 To get a sense of how RFW 
can address the issues arising from a split wildlife estate, consider the 
specifics of Colorado’s program, Colorado Ranching for Wildlife. The 
objectives of the program are to improve public access and 
recreational opportunities, preserve and protect wildlife habitat, 
improve and enhance wildlife habitat, more effectively implement 
species management plans, decrease or mitigate game damage, and 
improve relationships between Colorado Parks and Wildlife (CPW), 
 
 103.  See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
 104.  This is an umbrella term used to describe various landowner incentive programs in the 
West. 
 105.  LEAL & GREWELL, supra note 13, at 1. 
 106.  Id. at 17. California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah, among others, have developed 
ranching for wildlife programs with several thousands of private acres enrolled. Several other 
Western states have fledging programs with fewer acres enrolled. Id. 
 107.  Id. at 1. 
 108.  Id. at 2. 
 109.  See id. at 17–18 (providing an overview of each program’s structure and size). 
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private landowners, and hunters.110 To achieve those objectives at the 
lowest administrative cost, CPW targets large ranches and limits 
enrollment in the program to properties with at least 10,000 
contiguous acres.111 Twenty-nine ranches are currently enrolled.112 
As a prerequisite to enrollment, petitioning landowners and staff 
from CPW must agree to a management plan that specifies objective 
performance criteria for habitat improvements for game and non-
game species, species management, free public hunting access, and 
hunter satisfaction.113 Based on the landowner’s performance under 
these management objectives, CPW will lengthen hunting seasons 
and increase harvest limits on the property.114 These regulatory 
modifications give enrolled landowners more tools for limiting 
property damage and crop depredation. However, the primary 
incentive for landowners to enroll in the program is to earn 
transferable big-game hunting permits.115 These permits entitle the 
purchasing hunter to harvest a particular big game animal on the 
enrolled ranch.116 Landowners can sell the permits on the open 
market, often for thousands of dollars depending on the species and 
the quality of the hunting opportunity. The landowners choose to 
whom they will sell the permits and are entitled to all of the sale 
proceeds. The number of tags issued to the landowner is based on a 
tiered system reflecting the amount of habitat enhancements and free 
public hunting access the landowner provides.117 
 
 110.  COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, RANCHING FOR WILDLIFE OPERATING GUIDELINES 1 
(2012), available at https://wildlife.state.co.us/SiteCollectionDocuments/DOW/Hunting/ 
BigGame/Ranching/RFWGuidelines.pdf. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, RANCHING FOR WILDLIFE—RANCH SIZE, LOCATION, & 
SPECIES (2013), available at https://wildlife.state.co.us/SiteCollectionDocuments/DOW/Hunting/ 
BigGame/Ranching/PDF/RanchSizeLocationSpecies.pdf. 
 113.  COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, supra note 96, at 5. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  See id. at 16 (noting allocation of public to private hunting licenses). 
 116.  Id. Most states require a general hunting license for all hunting activity in the state, 
plus species and location specific permits for big game animals such as elk, deer, antelope, and 
turkey. Though landowners enrolled in Ranching for Wildlife can transfer the permits to 
whomever they like, most sell them to non-resident hunters because of the price differential 
between resident and non-resident permits. Colorado’s program grants tags for deer, elk, 
pronghorn, moose, bighorn sheep, and black bear. Ranching for Wildlife Hunter Information, 
COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, http://wildlife.state.co.us/Hunting/BigGame/RanchingforWildlife/ 
Pages/RFWHunterInformation.aspx (last updated Feb. 26, 2013). 
 117.  2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 210(E) (2012). 
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The public benefits generated by Colorado’s Ranching for 
Wildlife program are significant. Participating landowners have 
opened up public access to more than one million acres, over 50,000 
acres per year have active wildlife habitat improvements applied, and 
improved livestock grazing systems have been implemented on 
approximately eighty percent of the lands enrolled.118 Programs in 
other Western states have had similar success by aligning the 
incentives of private landowners with the public’s interest in 
wildlife.119 
Despite these successes, critics complain that ranching for 
wildlife programs constitute an unlawful privatization of wildlife,120 
and that allowing private landowners to profit from public wildlife is 
likely to “destroy the basic policies by which North America’s system 
of wildlife conservation operates.”121 Even under the assumption that 
enrolled landowners acquire an ownership interest in wildlife under 
 
 118.  Ranching for Wildlife, COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, https://wildlife.state.co.us/hunting/ 
biggame/ranchingforwildlife/pages/rfw.aspx (last updated Feb. 20, 2013). 
 119.  For example, California’s Private Land Management Program, encompassing over one 
million acres, has funded habitat enhancements for deer, elk, pronghorn antelope, wild turkeys, 
quail, waterfowl, as well as threatened and endangered species like the bald eagle and red-
legged frog. Private Lands Management, CAL. DEP’T FISH & WILDLIFE,  
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/wildlife/hunting/plm.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). Utah’s Cooperative 
Wildlife Management Units have opened more than two million acres of private land to the 
public. Cooperative Wildlife Management Units, UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., 
http://wildlife.utah.gov/dwr/about-the-program.html (last updated Oct. 3, 2012). Oklahoma’s 
Deer Management Assistance Program has significantly improved the white-tail deer 
management on private property, reduced property damage, and improved the data collection 
throughout the state. Deer Management Assistance, OKLA. DEP’T WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, 
http://www.wildlifedepartment.com/wildlifemgmt/deermanagement.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 
2013). 
 120.  See John Gibson, Ranching for Wildlife: Commercializing Public Wildlife, MONT. 
STANDARD (Nov. 6, 2008), http://www.plwa.org/viewarticle.php?id=84 (describing ranching for 
wildlife programs as a violation of the public trust doctrine); Chris Marchion, Ranching Model 
Doesn’t Work: Wildlife Management Technique Has Failed in Western States, MISSOULIAN (Nov. 
13, 2008), http://missoulian.com/news/opinion/editorial/article_7043df6d-dcc8-5489-8d88-
b758681dd779.html (“This approach returns wildlife to private commerce, animal husbandry 
and gives control of who gets a hunting license for use on specific private lands to participating 
landowners. While such a program has been tried in some Western states, it has failed to 
produce anticipated benefits for landowners, wildlife management and public opportunities.”); 
Public Ownership of Wildlife & the Threat of Privatization, MONT. WILDLIFE FED., 
http://www.montanawildlife.com/publications/huntingfishingfuture.htm (predicting ranching for 
wildlife would undermine the state’s cultural heritage and violate the public trust doctrine) (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2013); Tyler Baskfied, Ranching for Wildlife Program Criticized, CRAIG DAILY 
PRESS (July 6, 2000), http://www.craigdailypress.com/news/2000/jul/06/ranching_for_wildlife/ 
?print. 
 121.  Geist, supra note 40, at 16; see also Horner, supra note 18, at 29; Meyers, supra note 18. 
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ranching for wildlife contracts,122 RFW programs still comport with 
the historical guidelines of the public trust doctrine and the state’s 
role as trustee. First, the interest transferred does not amount to a 
total abdication of the state’s fiduciary obligations, as prohibited by 
Illinois Central and the basic principles of private trust law. Rather, it 
constitutes a sharing of wildlife management authority and the 
resulting revenues. The state wildlife agency retains control over the 
number of transferrable permits issued and the conditions by which 
those permits can issue. The state agency also holds discretionary 
authority over whether to approve or deny enrollment applications; 
no ranching for wildlife programs have automatic enrollment 
provisions. Thus, any management authority or ownership interest 
transferred under such a program is partial and revocable. In this 
way, it is more akin to the transfer of submerged land underlying a 
dock in Chicago’s harbor than the entire harbor itself, and more 
similar to a private trustee hiring janitorial service than delegating all 
of her fiduciary obligations. 
Secondly, any transfers of ownership or delegations of 
management authority accomplished by ranching for wildlife 
programs satisfy the public trust doctrine’s requirement of advancing 
the public interest.123 Recall that the enrolled landowner’s receipt of 
the transferable permits is conditioned on his or her performance of 
specific habitat enhancements and provision of public hunting 
opportunities. Though landowners profit from participation, the 
program provides a net benefit to both the landowners and the state. 
The transferable permits motivate the private landowners to better 
steward the public’s wildlife and to increase public hunting access on 
land that might otherwise be totally inaccessible. This quid pro quo 
contract grows the proverbial pie of wildlife benefits such that the 
 
 122.  Ample authority suggests such an ownership interest is severely limited by the public 
trust, if it exists at all. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 
723 (Cal. 1983) (explaining that “the grantee [of trust property] holds subject to the trust, and 
while he may assert a vested right to the servient estate (the right to use subject to the trust) and 
to any improvements he erects, he can claim no vested right to bar recognition of the trust or 
state action to carry out its purpose.”). See also generally Anna R.C. Casperson, Public Trust 
Doctrine and the Impossibility of Takings by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 357 (1996). 
 123.  The stated objectives of Colorado’s RFW Program speak to the way in which it 
harnesses landowner incentives and enhances the public’s interest in the wildlife trust property. 
These include (a) improving public access and recreational opportunities; (b) preserving and 
protecting wildlife habitat; (c) improving and enhancing wildlife habitat; (d) more effectively 
implementing species management plans; (e) decreasing or mitigating game damage; and (f) 
improving relationships between the Department of Wildlife, landowners, and sportsmen. 
COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, supra note 110, at 1. 
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public’s transfer of an ownership interest in wildlife ultimately 
generates more wildlife benefits for the public. 
In sum, landowner incentive programs such as ranching for 
wildlife overcome the split estate issues by aligning the incentives of 
private landowners with the public’s interest in wildlife—they 
“harmonize the public’s interest in sustaining wildlife populations 
with the landowner’s desire to manage wildlife on his or her 
property.”124 When private landowners view wildlife as an asset rather 
than a liability, they are more likely to be good wildlife stewards. 
IV. BARTERING IN BISON 
A non-game example of a more unified wildlife estate can be 
found on media mogul Ted Turner’s Green Ranch near Bozeman, 
Montana. The property is home to a herd of bison from Yellowstone 
National Park that is considered genetically pure125 and closely related 
to the historic Great Plains bison.126 The story of how the herd came 
to Turner’s ranch—not by migrating but by a memorandum of 
understanding—shows that public-private wildlife partnerships can 
enhance the health and value of wildlife resources. It also reveals how 
an expansive and historically unfounded interpretation of the public 
trust doctrine could discourage stewardship and destroy the value of 
wildlife resources. 
The story starts with a disease called Brucella abortus 
(brucellosis). Brucellosis causes miscarriage, infertility, and reduced 
milk production in cattle and flu-like symptoms in humans.127 
Scientists debate whether bison can transmit brucellosis to livestock, 
but most agree that approximately fifty percent of the Yellowstone 
Park bison test positive for the disease.128 If multiple brucellosis 
outbreaks occur in a single state within a twelve-month period, the 
 
 124.  LEAL & GREWELL, supra note 13, at 12. 
 125.  See R.O. Polzhiehn et al., Bovine mtDNA Discovered in North American Bison 
Populations, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638 (1995); Jim Robbins, Out West, With the Buffalo, 
Roam Some Strands of Undesirable DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at F2 (most American bison 
in the United States have some bovine genetics). 
 126.  Mont.-Turner Bison Agreement Challenged, MONT. STANDARD (Aug. 25, 2012), 
http://mtstandard.com/news/local/state-and-regional/mont—turner-bison-agreement-challenged/ 
article_bafe715a-ee6c-11e1-8e93-001a4bcf887a.html. 
 127.  U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., BRUCELLOSIS AND YELLOWSTONE BISON 1 (2007), available at  
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/cattle/downloads/cattle-bison.pdf. 
 128.  Jack C. Rhyan et al., Pathogens and Epidemiology of Brucellosis in Yellowstone Bison: 
Serologic and Culture Results from Adult Females and Their Progeny, 45 J. WILDLIFE DISEASES 
729, 730 (2009). 
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U.S. Department of Agriculture can revoke the state’s brucellosis-
free certification triggering extensive testing and vaccination 
protocols129 and reducing the marketability of the state’s livestock.130 
In short, Yellowstone Park bison and cattle do not mix.131 
In an attempt to fix the problem, a coalition of state and federal 
agencies began a quarantine feasibility study to develop procedures 
for certifying brucellosis-free bison.132 The objective was to transplant 
Yellowstone bison outside the Park to augment existing populations 
near extinction and to ensure that the bison population inside the 
Park does not exceed carrying capacity.133 As part of the five-year 
program, an initial herd of 100 bison calves was quarantined and 
serially tested for brucellosis.134 In March 2009, Montana Fish, 
Wildlife & Parks (FWP) completed an environmental assessment for 
the placement of the first group of quarantined bison on the Wind 
River Reservation of the Northern Arapaho Tribe in Wyoming.135 
Before the animals were moved, the Tribe rescinded their offer to 
accept the bison because it had been unable to secure the necessary 
facilities.136 In November 2009, the bison quarantine facility reached 
its maximum capacity, requiring the immediate relocation of the 
eighty-eight bison remaining from the original herd.137 
Earlier, in June 2009, FWP had published a request for proposals 
announcing the availability of the brucellosis-free bison, the 
conservation objectives of the translocation effort, and the criteria for 
 
 129.  See MONT. ADMIN. R. §§ 32.3.411–32.3.437 (defining the testing and vaccination 
procedures for livestock operations in the designated surveillance area bordering Yellowstone 
National Park). 
 130.  M. Jeff Hagener, Concerns about Brucellosis in Montana, MAGAZINE MONT. FISH, 
WILDLIFE & PARKS, http://fwp.mt.gov/mtoutdoors/HTML/director/2008/SO08.htm (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2013) (Brucellosis outbreaks did occur in Montana in 2007 and 2008, causing the state 
to lose its brucellosis-free certification). 
 131.  See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., supra note 127, at 2. During the harsh winter of 1996 to 
1997, thousands of bison began to migrate out of Yellowstone in search of food. Their migration 
pattern crossed over National Forest land and private ranches where cattle grazed. Given the 
potential for transmission, federal and state officials attempted to haze the bison back onto park 
land. Id. When those efforts failed, officials shot or sent to slaughter 1,079 bison. Id. An 
additional 1,300 starved to death inside the Park. Id. 
 132.  MONTANA FISH, WILDLIFE, & PARKS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, BISON 
TRANSLOCATION, BISON QUARANTINE PHASE IV (2010), available at fwp.mt.gov/ 
fwpDoc.html?id=41816. 
 133.  Id. at 6–7. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See generally id. 
 136.  Id. at 6–7. 
 137.  Id. 
Watson (Do Not Delete) 5/19/2013  10:43 PM 
318 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIII:291 
the facilities needed to house and continue testing the herd.138 FWP 
received seven proposals139 and chose Turner’s proposal on the basis 
of available carrying capacity, fencing, the ability to keep the bison 
separate from livestock, and the ability to comply with the feasibility 
study’s testing protocols.140 
Because Turner would bear the cost of relocating, feeding, caring 
for, and otherwise maintaining the herd until the end of the five-year 
research period, the memorandum of understanding specified that 
Turner would retain seventy-five percent of the offspring born during 
his stewardship.141 FWP explained how the quid-pro-quo would 
advance the objectives of the feasibility study and bison conservation, 
generally: 
This portion of the proposed action will help serve the objectives of 
the research project, will serve to propagate a brucellosis-free herd 
of bison, and will encourage partners of this research project to 
carry out future conservation and restoration efforts of 
Yellowstone bison. In the case of TEI, the remaining QF progeny 
may be used to increase the genetic diversity of TEI’s Castle Rock 
bison herd in northern New Mexico. That herd, which originated in 
Yellowstone Park in the 1930s, has been managed as a closed herd 
since then and has been identified by Texas A&M as genetically 
“pure” and unique.142 
Nonetheless, and perhaps not surprisingly, several groups 
immediately sued FWP, arguing that the transfer of a portion of the 
quarantined herd’s progeny violated the public trust by privatizing 
public wildlife.143 The cashless nature of the agreement is the 
plaintiffs’ primary focus. Glenn Hockett with the Gallatin Wildlife 
 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See id. at 7 (listing the applicants as the Fort Belknap Indian Community, Turner 
Enterprises, Inc., Chicago Zoological Society, Billings Zoo, Wildlife Conservation Society, and 
two other private entities). 
 140.  Memorandum of Understanding between Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Montana 
Department of Wildlife, and Turner Enterprises, Inc (Feb. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.buffalofieldcampaign.org/legislative/quarantine/Turner_bison_agreement_signed_fe
b_2010.pdf. 
 141.  Id. at 3. 
 142.  MONTANA FISH, WILDLIFE, & PARKS, supra note 132, at 13. 
 143.  Complaint at 3, Western Watersheds Project, Gallatin Wildlife Association, Buffalo 
Field Campaign, Yellowstone Buffalo Foundation v. State of Montana & Montana Dept. of Fish 
Wildlife and Parks (Mont. Dist. Ct. 2010). The plaintiffs have asked the court to “declare FWP’s 
attempted privatization of publicly held wildlife a violation of its public trust responsibilities, 
enjoin the State/FWP from transferring title to these publicly held bison to a private party, and 
remand to FWP with instructions to prepare a full EIS to analyze a full range of alternatives 
that would ensure all surviving bison and their offspring are managed as wildlife for 
conservation purposes, and not privatized or commercialized.” Id. 
Watson (Do Not Delete) 5/19/2013  10:43 PM 
Spring 2013] PUBLIC WILDLIFE ON PRIVATE LAND 319 
Association explained, “[t]hey need to remain in public hands. Paying 
[Ted Turner] by bartering the public’s wildlife is a violation of the 
public trust.”144 
As a threshold issue, the court must decide whether to apply the 
public trust doctrine to wildlife as separate from or subsumed in the 
agency’s constitutional, statutory, and regulatory obligations. 
Montana’s constitution requires that the state “maintain and improve 
a clean and healthful environment . . . for present and future 
generations.”145 Additionally, FWP is charged with the statutory duty 
to supervise all the wildlife in the state146 and the regulatory duty to 
“protect, enhance, and regulate the wise use of the state’s wildlife 
resources for public benefit now and in the future.”147 
Assuming the court does apply the doctrine separately,148 the 
initial inquiry is whether the interest transferred amounts to a total 
abdication of the state’s fiduciary obligations. Because the state is 
attempting to transfer legal title to the animals, as opposed to a 
transferable permit which allows a hunter to establish ownership via 
the rule of capture, the issue is closer in this case than in the context 
of ranching for wildlife and other permit-based landowner incentive 
programs. However, if the court finds that the evidence supports 
FWP’s conclusion that no other facility could have taken the bison, 
leaving slaughter as the only alternative, it is unlikely to conclude the 
state abdicated its fiduciary duty as trustee.149 In other words, if the 
decision FWP faced was whether to save all of the living animals from 
the original herd plus twenty-five percent of the offspring at the end 
 
 144.  Lawsuit Challenges Bison Transfer to Ted Turner, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/lawsuit-challenges-bison-transfer-to-
ted-turner/article_1e0c53b0-36d3-11df-951d-001cc4c002e0.html. 
 145.  MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 146.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-201(1). But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-201(5) (2012) 
(authorizing FWP to “dispose of all property owned by the state used for the protection, 
preservation, management, and propagation of fish, game, fur-bearing animals, and game and 
nongame birds that is of no further value or use to the state”).  
 147.  MONT. ADMIN. R. § 12.1.101(8)(b) (2012). 
 148.  See Redmond, supra note 18, at 252–57 (describing outcomes in different states and 
the unpredictability of courts on this issue). 
 149.  See William Corbet, Montana Administrative Law Practice: 41 Years after Enactment of 
the Montana Administrative Procedures Act, 73 MONT. L. REV. 339, 384 (2012). In Montana, 
courts review an agency record “to determine whether (1) the agency findings of fact are 
properly supported by the record evidence, (2) the agency interpretations of law are correct, (3) 
the agency properly applied law to fact, and (4) the agency has not abused its discretion on 
matters where the court accords the agency discretion.” Id. (citing Hughes v. Mont. Bd. of 
Medical Examiners, 80 P.3d 415 (Mont. 2003)). 
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of the study period, or to save none, the agency could hardly be 
faulted for abdicating its trust duties. 
The second requirement of the public trust doctrine is that any 
transfers of ownership or delegations of management authority must 
be done for the benefit of the public, not “for the benefit of private 
individuals as distinguished from the public.”150 No doubt, Turner 
Enterprises is deriving a private benefit by acquiring animals from 
one of the most genetically pure herds of bison. The question is 
whether the public will derive any benefits from the transfer. This 
inquiry is not an examination of fairness but rather whether the 
private and public interests are conflicting or aligned. By preventing 
the slaughter of the quarantined animals and, perhaps more 
importantly, by allowing the feasibility study to continue so that more 
translocations might occur in the future, the proposed ownership 
transfer appears to generate both private and public benefits. As Russ 
Miller of Turner Enterprises explained, “We’re not a philanthropy. 
We’re trying to create a blend between conservation and 
commercialization.”151 
It remains to be seen how the Montana courts will resolve the 
case.152 Because the transaction at issue contemplates transferring full 
legal title of wild animals to a private enterprise in exchange for the 
stewardship of other wild animals and the myriad public benefits that 
flow from that stewardship, the court might find it difficult to side-
step the public trust issues. A decision to strike down the agreement 
on public trust grounds would further polarize the public wildlife-
private habitat issue and discourage wildlife agencies and private 
landowners from future collaboration. By contrast, a decision to 
uphold the agreement as consistent with the public trust doctrine 
would set a rare precedent for unifying the split wildlife estate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The split ownership of wildlife and wildlife habitat raises issues 
of public access, private property damage, and the division of 
 
 150.  Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896). 
 151.  Ted Turner’s Bid to House Yellowstone Bison Draws Protest, L.A.TIMES: L.A. 
UNLEASHED BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 5:04 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/unleashed/2010/01/ 
bison-ted-turner.html. 
 152.  The case came to trial on March 29, 2013. Laura Lundquist, Turner Bison Case Comes 
to Trial, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/ 
news/wildlife/article_d4830a8c-98ee-11e2-8b8b-001a4bcf887a.html. As of this writing, no ruling 
has yet been issued. 
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economic rents. Policies that unify ownership can align the financial 
incentives of private landowners with the public’s interest in wildlife 
stewardship. Revenue sharing programs like ranching for wildlife 
have increased public hunting access, improved habitat conditions on 
a landscape scale, and given landowners more flexibility to manage 
their property. However, as evidenced by the bison barter currently 
pending in Montana, even more can be done to unify the split wildlife 
estate. The public trust doctrine does not preclude states from 
transferring to private parties an ownership interest or management 
authority in wildlife; it only requires that such transfers and 
delegations are consistent with the state’s fiduciary obligations as 
trustee and the public’s interest as the beneficiary. 
 
 
 
